For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else.

'If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound.

What has been said of statements applies also to opinions'. The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances.

'Statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs.

Something more like a correspondence theory is evident in The Categories. The medieval scholastic logicians frequently cited Aristotle's characterisation of truth in Categories 4a35

Si solum addatur modus et non res tunc gratia modi causatur distinctio, tunc non causabitur veritas vel falsitas gratia istius modi quia in eo quod res est vel non est etc. 4 1027 b20 he says that being true or false depends on combination and separation in judgment, then adds puzzlingly that falsity and truth are not in things 'it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false'. However, this creates difficulties for scientific or mathematical statements which seem to be eternally true, yet may have no instances at some point in time – was the proposition 'any triangle has three angles' true before any triangles existed? See also Metaphysics Book II 993b30-31 'The principles of eternal things must be always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth'. It is not clear whether he has a so-called correspondence theory of truth in mind, or something more like a deflationary theory, since he is not clear about what aspect of reality is responsible for truth or falsity.

And we speak truly if we say that snow is white, or if we say that snow is not blue. Possibly Aristotle's most well-known definition of truth is in the Metaphysics, ( 1011b25): “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.įor example, assuming that it is the case that snow is white, and that it is not the case that snow is blue, then we speak falsely if we say that snow is not white, or if we say that it is blue.

Metaphysics according to aristotle